Yearly Archives: 2012

225 – It was 50 years ago today

October 5, 2012 marks the 50th anniversary of The Beatles’ first proper release. The single Love Me Do came out in England to no outstanding acclaim, enjoying moderate chart success. Like most aspects of The Beatles’ career, there is a great story behind it.

The year 1962 started with The Beatles failing an audition for a recording contract with Decca. The man who turned them down, Dick Rowe, signed Brian Poole and the Tremilos instead! Imagine the regret he’s lived with ever since. However, if you listen to what the Beatles recorded for Decca that day (available on various semi-legal releases, and in part on ‘Anthology 1′), his decision is understandable. The recordings are fascinating in the light of what came later but, in truth, they aren’t very good, and some parts are cringe-worthy. Listening to it, it would have been hard to imagine any particularly notable success for the band.

This was the most well-known of numerous knock-backs they received. Pretty much every record label in England turned them down, including Parlophone, the label they would end up on. George Martin, the head of Parlophone, heard nothing that interested him in the Decca audition recordings when they were played to him by Beatles’ manager Brian Epstein. However, some months later, Martin was forced to offer them a recording contract by his boss, who was responding to enormous pressure from their in-house publishing company, which wanted to publish the songs of Lennon and McCartney.

Their first Parlophone recording session on June 5 was different from the Decca episode in several ways. For one thing, from the two songs that survive from the session, they sound much better – more together and fuller. Secondly, three of the four songs recorded were Lennon and McCartney originals, including Love Me Do, whereas for Decca they mainly recorded cover versions. Thirdly, they had a recording contract – it was not an audition.

After the recording session Martin’s main negative comment was that he didn’t think much of their drummer, Pete Best. This precipitated one of the most discussed episodes in the band’s career: Best’s sacking and replacement by Ringo Starr, right on the cusp of their breakthrough to massive success. This was really tough on Best. He had paid his dues thoroughly with the band, performing in hundreds of shows with them, and being a key part of their evolution from rank amateurs to a band ready for extreme greatness. He had suffered with them through two years of extremely poor playing conditions and long, long hours in the seedy clubs of Hamburg. Best was also a popular band member amongst Beatles fans, due to his moody good looks – a sort of James Dean character. (You can get some hint of that in the above photo – Best is on the left).

The other element of the controversy was the way he found out the news – from manager Brian Epstein, rather than from his fellow band members. It was terribly cowardly of them, really.

So why was he sacked? A range of reasons have been proposed.

(a) He didn’t fit in well with the other three Beatles, who were extremely tight-knit and shared a distinctive sense of humour, and a distinctive hair-do which Best refused to adopt.

(b) The others were jealous of his popularity.

(c) He was a poor drummer.

I think reason (b) is implausible. A popular, handsome member is an asset to a pop band. Each of them had an avid individual following, anyway, even in those early days. This reason was made up by fans in Liverpool who lacked the musical knowledge to judge reason (c).

The Beatles themselves referred to reason (a) in the ‘Anthology’ TV series, and it certainly was part of it. Best kept himself apart from the other three, choosing not to socialise with them.

But the main reason was (c). You can hear Best’s drumming on various historical releases from those very early days, and it is generally pretty bad. In particular, on that first recorded version of Love Me Do from June 1962 (released in 1995 on ‘Anthology 1’), the drumming is absolutely terrible. No wonder Martin didn’t like it. It must have grated on John, Paul and George, who were solid musicians (or much better than solid in Paul’s case). It would have been absolutely obvious to them that Best was their musical weak link. Replacing him with Ringo gave them a much tighter more professional sound, and he was much more engaged and lively on stage.

So the first set of recordings was shelved. When The Beatles returned to the Abbey Road recording studio on September 4 to have another go at recording their first single, Ringo was the drummer, having quit his existing band with only a couple of days’ notice. George was sporting a black eye, received from a Beatles fan protesting about Best’s sacking (or another theory is that it was a local tough jealous of his girlfriend’s interest in the band). George’s head is intentionally angled away from the camera in the photo from the session (left – he is second from the left) to hide his shiner.

There were two songs in contention for the single A side: Love Me Do and a song that George Martin preferred, How Do You Do It?, which was not a Beatles original. After the sessions, The Beatles argued strongly that they wanted to go with Love Me Do rather than covering somebody else’s song. This speaks volumes about their confidence even then. These days, it is expected for bands to write their own material, but that is purely a result of The Beatles. It was almost unheard of in those days. And to resist the preferences of their producer, who would have been used to getting his own way, was also courageous. What’s more, George Martin’s judgement about the commercial potential of the other song was spot on. It was later a number 1 hit for Gerry and the Pacemakers.

But the Beatles hated How Do You Do It? – it was far too wimpy for them. So, right from the start, The Beatles demanded creative freedom from their producer. George Martin really didn’t want to allow it – he still didn’t think much of Love Me Do. However, when the songwriter of How Do You Do It? heard the Beatles recording of it, he hated what they had done to it, and refused to allow them to release it, leaving Martin with no choice but to make Love Me Do the A side.

Because How Do You Do It? was ruled out, they now lacked a recording for the B side. So they went back to Abbey Road a week later to record P.S. I Love You. This marked another dramatic moment, as the Parlophone producer (not George Martin this time, but a stand-in named Ron Richards) had engaged a session drummer, Andy White, to replace Ringo. This was really unnecessary and unfair on Ringo. His playing on the second version was fine, although he’d had some difficulties during the second recording session. You can’t hear Ringo’s difficulties in the recording (it is available on ‘Past Masters Volume 1’), but there were other more obvious weaknesses; Paul’s singing was a little bit off in one or two places, and the bass guitar was slightly out of tune. So it was fortunate that they had this third session, as it gave them the opportunity to record Love Me Do for a third time (once they’d finished recording P.S. I Love You), and this time they nailed it. Ringo was gutted not to be playing on it, but he dutifully played tambourine along with the session drummer. This certainly is the best version of the three, due to better singing, the bass guitar tuning and the overall mix – nothing to do with the drumming.

Ironically, when the single came out on October 5, due to a mix-up, it contained the second version with Ringo on drums. It was switched to the third version on the ‘Please Please Me’ album and on subsequent pressings of the single. To avoid that mistake happening again, EMI destroyed the master tape of the Ringo version. They had to take it from a copy of the first pressing of the single to include it on ‘Past Masters Volume 1’.

The song peaked at number 17 on the English charts. To me, this seems about right. As a song, Love Me Do is OK but not great – probably their weakest single. Mind you, it  could have gone higher if Parlophone had promoted it properly. George Martin felt it had no prospects of making the charts, and left it to sink. Only after it made the top 20 anyway did he realise that he’d misjudged it and come fully on side as an enthusiastic ally.

Love Me Do is one of only a few of their very early compositions that they actually recorded for EMI. (others included One After 909, I’ll Follow the Sun and When I’m 64.) Interestingly, they had written dozens of songs together in 1957-59, but hadn’t written any at all in the two years before Brian Epstein became their manager at the end of 1961. In their shows they were solely a covers band until they got the recording contract, and for some reason they were kicked into action as composers at that time (probably encouraged by Epstein).

Love Me Do wasn’t released in the US at that time. By the time it was, in 1964, The Beatles were totally dominating the music industry, and it went to number 1 as a matter of course.

After Love Me Do, the pace of The Beatles’ improvement in song writing and recording was unbelievable, reaching something close to perfection just 4-5 years later with the Penny Lane/Strawberry Fields Forever single and then the ‘Sgt Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band’ album. Play Love Me Do and Strawberry Fields Forever back to back and be amazed. From simple pop song to an astonishingly great piece of art in four years.

P.S. 27 December 2013. I have extensively edited the piece to bring it into line with the correct history, as described in the fantastic new biography “Tune In” by Mark Lewisohn. His account corrects a number of errors that have been perpetuated in all previous biographies. For example, he clarifies that the first session for Parlophone was not an audition – they already had a contract by then. Also I had no idea that George Martin signed them against his will. That’s amazing. It is also the first book to be really clear about why Pete Best was sacked. I’ve always known he was a terrible drummer with awful timing – just listen to the recordings! But no previous book had made clear to non-musician readers how terrible he was. They can have no doubt after reading this book. Here are four examples that make the point eloquently.

Early Beatles collaborator Tony Sheridan said, “Pete was a crap drummer, you can take my word for it. He was just not competent, and there were discrepancies between his feet and his hands.”

In an earlier recording session in Germany, the producer didn’t think Pete’s drumming was good enough for recording. He physically removed the bass drum and tom-tom drum from his kit in an attempt to keep him on time! The engineer from the session was quoted saying “the drummer is just bloody awful”.

The engineer from the Decca audition session said, “I thought Pete Best was very average and didn’t keep good time. You could pick up a better drummer in any pub in London. … If Decca was going to sign the Beatles, we wouldn’t have used Pete Best on the records.”

Ron Richards (main producer on first Parlophone session), said to George Martin, “He’s useless; we’ve got to change this drummer.”

Clearly, there was absolutely no way Best could stay in the Beatles. Best himself didn’t accept that his drumming was not up to scratch, and repeatedly claimed that there must have been some other reason for his sacking. That he could listen to those recordings and think they were OK just reinforces how unsuitable he was.

224 – Torturing ourselves over discounting

Economists’ practice of discounting benefits from the distant future to make them comparable to current costs is fraught with disagreement and controversy. But for projects that are not very big and very long-term, there is often no need for us to torture ourselves over how and how much to discount.

Discounting became a topic of broad discussion in the wake of public debates about studies of the economics of climate change mitigation. Most of the predicted benefits from actions we take now to attempt to mitigate climate change are predicted to occur in the distant future – e.g. 100 to 200 years hence. Discounting is used to convert those future benefits into present values, so that they can be compared with present costs, in order to judge whether and which action is worth taking.

It makes a huge difference to the result how much and how you discount. The problem is that there is wide disagreement amongst economists on how much and how to do it. Positions adopted by different economists include that:

  • We should use the rate of growth of the economy as the discount rate.
  • We should use a probability distribution of discount rates to allow for uncertainty about future growth rates (Weitzman 1998). The result of this approach is equivalent to using a discount rate that declines over time.
  • We should reduce the discount rate on equity grounds so that people in the future are not disadvantaged. (That’s the position taken in the Stern Review.)
  • We should not use discounting at all because discounting and Benefit: Cost Analysis are the wrong way to think about the problem.

The fact that views about discounting are so diverse reflects that we actually don’t have a sound theory for discounting in the long term that deals with all of the complexities of the issue. As Steve Schilizzi and I point out in our 2006 book on discounting, a sound theory for discounting in the very long term would have to deal simultaneously with three issues: efficiency (maximising the size of the pie, irrespective of who wins and loses), equity (who wins and loses) and uncertainty (which, when thinking about the very long term, is extreme).

I provide an intuitive illustration of the difficulties and dilemmas in Pannell Discussion 34.

For now, my view is that, if we are going to use discounting for benefits and costs in the very long term, the most defensible approach is that of Weitzman. He at least allows us to combine efficiency and uncertainty (about the discount rate – not about other things). I don’t think anybody has any valid idea how to adjust discount rates to account for equity. Certainly not Stern. His adjustments, supposedly for equity, made his results more inequitable, in my view.

Maybe some bright spark will sort it out eventually. Or maybe the problem is just intractable and will never be resolved. Maybe we’ll eventually converge on the view that discounting is the wrong way to think about the problem – that’s where my colleague Steve Schilizzi has moved to recently.

Given all the options and disagreements, discounting is a topic that environmental economists like to torture themselves and each other with. We write many papers and books and reviews about the options and the difficulties, often sounding confident, but in reality not getting particularly close to a genuine resolution.

An unfortunate consequence of this focus on the difficulties of long-term discounting is that it starts to create doubts about the use of discounting in the short term. In fact, discounting benefits and costs in the short term (within a generation – say 30 years) is reasonably unproblematic, in my view, and should be undertaken in all project assessments. The things that make long-term discounting so problematic – extreme uncertainty, inter-generational equity – are much less serious in the short term.

Of course there is uncertainty about most projects or investments, even in the short term. But it’s usually fairly safe to assume that the range of potential outcomes is within a probability distribution that we can imagine in the present. In the very long term, it’s not safe to make that assumption; the world is likely to change in fundamental but currently unimagined ways.

Equity is a significant factor that needs to be considered in the short term as well as the long term, but in the short term it is possible to offset undesirable equity outcomes using other mechanisms, such as financial transfers. In the short term, adjusting discount rates is clearly not the way to pursue equity. For large, long-term problems like climate change, my feeling is that efficiency and equity are intertwined and inseparable (although it still isn’t clear that adjusting interest rates is a sensible way to advance equity).

So for projects that are not really big and long-term, my view is that standard text-book discounting methods are completely appropriate. The discount rate should be the opportunity cost of capital (often the interest rate on borrowings). This applies to all sorts of projects, including environmental and social projects that generate non-financial benefits.

Even if the project you are assessing would generate benefits beyond 30 years, sometimes it’s reasonable just to ignore those later benefits. This isn’t as bad as it might sound, as present values are small relative to future values beyond 30 years (e.g. if a constant discount rate of 5% is used, future values get reduced to 23% after 30 years, 9% after 50 years).

Another potential justification for ignoring benefits beyond a few decades is that one’s confidence that those benefits would actually be maintained decreases for the more distant future.

Thirdly, it may be that we are only interested in generating the benefits for a few decades and not beyond.

Fourthly, for many projects, including or excluding those later benefits would not alter the decision on whether to fund the project. This could be explored using sensitivity analysis with different discount rates or methods. If the result is not affected by inclusion or exclusion of later benefits, we can conveniently side-step the tricky issues around long-term discounting.

Of course, there are cases where the long-term benefits really matter to us and would make a difference to funding decisions. In these cases, follow  Weitzman.

 Further reading

Pannell, D.J. and Schilizzi, S. (eds) (2006). Economics and the Future: Time and Discounting in Private and Public Decision Making, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA.

Pannell, D.J. (1997). Sensitivity analysis of normative economic models: Theoretical framework and practical strategies. Agricultural Economics 16(2): 139-152. Full paper hereIDEAS page for this paper

Weitzman, M.L., (1998). Why the far-distant future should be discounted at its lowest possible rate, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 36(3), 201-208. IDEAS page for this paper

 

223 – Leadership

Strong, inspiring, visionary leadership can have a huge influence on people, pulling them together and changing their direction. But is it the only thing that can achieve that? And is it necessarily a good thing?

I participated in a very interesting discussion about leadership this week. One of the participants was a radio astronomer who had been involved in the successful bid for the Square Kilometre Array project in Western Australia – a massive undertaking. She said that a key factor in getting radio astronomers to overcome their differences and unify behind the bid was a small number of outstanding leaders in the discipline. Most people in the discussion were agricultural scientists, and they were discussing whether agricultural scientists could also get a large, visionary national project funded in Australia and what could be learnt from the SKA experience.

One of agriculturalists argued that leadership is not just important for change, it is essential — that you generally don’t see big changes occur across a large group of people where the change propagates from the bottom up. That was quite thought provoking, and at the time I couldn’t think of a counter example.

Later on I identified a couple of economics-related examples where major changes regularly happen without any leadership at all. One is our adoption of new technologies. Think of Steve Jobs and Apple. No doubt, Jobs was the archetype of a strong, inspiring, visionary leader within Apple, and had a huge influence on the company and its staff. But outside the company, it was different. We didn’t all buy ipods, iphones, ipads and ikettles because we were inspired and led by Steve Jobs. (Well, maybe a few did, but mostly not.) We did it because these are great products, and perhaps because Apple has a cool reputation. Millions of us changed our behaviour towards purchase of Apple products, and that in turn further influenced our behaviour in myriad ways, but there was no unifying leader that directly influenced us to change in these ways.

Another example is the behaviour of people in markets. Markets can have a major influence on the behaviour of people by the simple mechanism of pricing. If there is a shortage of a product (say, wheat), the price is bid up. This encourages more producers to produce wheat, and it encourages consumers of wheat to cut back on their wheat consumption, so the shortage is addressed. The wonder of the market is that there is no leadership required for this to happen. It occurs efficiently and reliably through the aggregation of many individual decisions.

Could these examples provide a different way (other than by leadership) to bring agricultural scientists together, to push them in a particular new direction? Perhaps it would be possible to think about the incentives that scientists face and influence their behaviour by modifying those incentives. That might mean that we wouldn’t need inspiring leadership, but I think we would still require strong leadership with a clear vision to arrange for the new incentives to be put in place. So for this particular type of change, my feeling is that the comment was right; leadership is crucial.

My other thought about this, though, is that we should be careful what we wish for. The directions that leaders take us in are not necessarily good ones. In the agricultural context, I’d point to the history of salinity in Australia. The profile of salinity as a problem for agriculture (as well as for water, biodiversity and infrastructure) grew through the 1980s and 1990s, culminating in the creation of the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality in 2000. A small number of high-profile scientist leaders/advocates were pivotal in the creation of this $1.4 billion program. It was the one of the biggest environmental programs in Australia’s history, and its creation must have seemed like a huge success for those who had been pushing for it. But in fact the program was fundamentally misconceived. It would have needed to be designed and delivered in entirely different ways to have any chance of meeting its objectives. In the wake of its obvious failure, resources for salinity management and salinity research have almost completely dried up. So the apparent major success of getting a huge national program established was actually the beginning of the end of the issue as a national priority.

Further reading

Hermalin, B.E. (1998). Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example, American Economic Review 88(5), 1188-1206. IDEAS page for this paper

Pannell, D.J. and Roberts, A.M. (2010). The National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality: A retrospective assessment, Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 54(4): 437-456. Journal web site hereIDEAS page for this paper

 

222 – Technology versus labour in agriculture

A key component of the transition from agriculture-based economies to industrial and service-based economies is the substitution of new technologies for labour in agriculture. This reduces the demand for labour in agriculture, and allows labour to move to more productive jobs in manufacturing and services. Western industrialised countries went through this process in the 19th and 20th centuries, and many developing countries, such as those of south-east Asia, have been following in their footsteps in recent decades.

The process doesn’t all go smoothly, and not everyone who exits from agriculture is better off – just think about conditions in the factories of England during the industrial revolution. But in the long term it’s an essential element of improving the quality of life for the great majority of people.

Sometimes the process involves farmers adopting attractive new labour-saving technologies and shedding labour, which then has to leave agriculture to find work. In other cases, labour is pulled, rather than pushed, out of agriculture, and farmers have to adopt labour-saving technologies because there is a shortage of labour, reflected in rising labour costs.

One of my PhD students, Jessie Beltran, did a study that illustrates the latter process beautifully. In the Philippines, there has been increased demand for labour in non-agricultural sectors of the economy. The resulting increase in labour costs has affected rice farmers, who have traditionally relied on a highly labour-intensive form of agriculture, especially for planting and weeding.

Jessie built an economic model of the planting and weeding decisions of Philippine rice farmers and used it to explore the consequences of rising labour costs. The results were just what you would expect. If labour is cheap, the traditional labour-intensive transplanting approach to seeding is the most profitable option. As labour costs increase, direct seeding becomes more profitable because it requires much less labour.

In addition, if labour is cheap and weed numbers are not excessive, it is best to rely on manual weeding, with people pulling up every weed in the crop by hand. However at higher labour costs, application of chemical herbicides becomes the more profitable option.

Both of these changes are occurring in reality in the Philippines. An inevitable side effect in the medium term will be the evolution of herbicide-resistant weeds. At this stage, farmers there have little or no awareness of the risk of resistance, but the first cases of it have already been discovered. It will be only a matter of time before most farmers who use herbicides have problems with resistance, and have to look again at more expensive, less convenient weed control strategies. But they’ll have to do that in the context of high labour costs, so they are likely to employ different weeding technologies, rather than going back to hand weeding.

Further reading

Beltran, J.C., Pannell, D.J., Doole, G.J. and White, B. (2012). A bioeconomic model for analysis of integrated weed management strategies for annual barnyardgrass (Echinochloa crus-galli complex) in Philippine rice farming systems, Agricultural Systems 112(1), 1–10. Journal web site ♦ IDEAS page for this paper

Beltran, J.C., Pannell, D.J. and Doole, G. (2012). Economic implications of herbicide resistance and high labour costs for management of annual barnyardgrass (Echinochloa crus-galli) in Philippine rice farming systems, Crop Protection 31: 31-39. Journal web siteIDEAS page for this paper

221 – Valuing environmental intangibles, part 4: The upshot

In Part 2 I argued that information about environmental values is essential for making good decisions about how to spend the money in environmental programs. In Part 3 I discussed some of the criticisms that have been made of the main survey-based methods that economists use for this purpose. Part 4  is the “so what” part: considering all of that, what should we do?

The main criticisms of non-market valuation surveys that I think have substance are that, in some cases, the general public is not well enough informed to provide meaningful values, and that surveys are too expensive to be conducted for every environmental decision that has to be made.

The first point was emphasised by Drew Collins in his comment on Part 3. Later on I’ll talk about some alternative approaches that avoid this problem.

The high cost of non-market valuation surveys is a significant factor when considering how widely they can and should be used. This suggests that we should look at cheap ways to get at relatively approximate values.

The non-market valuation community has come up with “benefit transfer” as their cheap and cheerful option. The idea with benefit transfer is to find other non-market valuation studies for environmental benefits that are similar to the one you are interested in, and use or adapt those. It’s a sensible idea, as long as you can find suitable studies to transfer the values from. That is not necessarily easy. The number and diversity of situations from which values are needed is enormous, whereas the number of existing good-quality non-market valuation studies, while growing, is still relatively modest. Given this, in many cases there will be high uncertainty about how applicable the transferred values are. In general, transferred values are probably rough approximations. But that may be OK — rough approximations are definitely a lot better than nothing when prioritising environmental projects (Pannell, 2009). Indeed, once the high cost of getting more accurate values is considered, approximate information may actually be the best option in many cases.

Transferring benefits like this is not that different from transferring other types of information from one context to another, which happens all the time. For example, when evaluating an environmental project, we need information about the cause-and-effect relationships between management and outcomes, and about the level of compliance/cooperation we are likely to get from the community, and usually we rely on information from studies of other cases to make judgments about these things.

Benefit transfer is not the only way to get approximate non-market values. Another option is to ask a small panel of people to make subjective judgments about the importance or significance of the environmental benefits. (I’ll call these ‘deliberative’ approaches.) There are various versions of this. The approach is sometimes used in Multi-Criteria Analysis, as well as in a variety of related processes that involve providing information to a group of citizens and asking them to make judgments about particular issues (e.g. citizens’ panels, citizens’ juries, citizens’ councils, deliberative focus groups). A third approach is the one we developed for our environmental investment framework, INFFER, where environmental values are elicited from environmental managers using a table of well known environmental assets as examples and a scoring system that converts to dollar values. A fourth version is where the judgments are made by experts (as commonly happens). These deliberative approaches can range from quick and dirty through to quite elaborate and time consuming.

Often deliberative approaches result in environmental benefits being scored or ranked, rather than them being valued in dollar terms. That is sufficient for some decisions (e.g. a consistent scoring system is sufficient for prioritisation of projects when the budget is fixed) but not others (e.g. judgments about how big the budget should be). Deliberative approaches to elicit dollar values for assets are perhaps under-utilised, with the INFFER approach being a rare example.

The main disadvantage of this group of approaches is that the panel’s or experts’ judgments may not be representative of the broader community, and it’s hard to tell whether they are or not.

On the other hand, there are several advantages. The panel can include experts, and/or information can be provided to the panel members in much more depth than is ever possible in a survey. The process can involve discussion and debate, prompting people to think more deeply about the issues. And it is possible to generate values much more cheaply and rapidly relative to doing a survey. The extent of this last benefit depends on how the process is run.

I’m not saying these deliberative processes should always be preferred to non-market valuation surveys. I’d suggest that valuation surveys could be worth investing in where the environmental problem is particularly important, the environmental issues are well known to and well understood by the community, and the results of a survey could make a pivotal difference to whether a major project proceeds. Non-market surveys might also be attractive as a relatively independent approach, particularly where the debate has become partisan or dominated by special interest groups. Beyond this, it is helpful to have a variety of non-market valuation results on the shelf, to help inform benefit transfer, and perhaps to provide information to inform deliberative panels.

Where good quality valuation studies for similar problems are available, benefit transfer may provide a viable fallback option.

Where resources or time are too limited to do a fresh survey (i.e. usually), and benefit transfer is not suitable, or the valuation issue would benefit from a transparent, well-informed discussion and debate, one of the deliberative approaches might be the best option.

Further reading

Pannell, D.J. (2009). The cost of errors in prioritising projects, INFFER Working Paper 0903, University of Western Australia. Full paper (350K)

Pannell, D.J., Roberts, A.M., Park, G., Alexander, J., Curatolo, A. and Marsh, S. (2012). Integrated assessment of public investment in land-use change to protect environmental assets in Australia, Land Use Policy 29(2): 377-387. Journal web site ♦ IDEAS page for this paper