Category Archives: Marine

309 – Why do fishers in Chile put up with poachers?

Fishers in Chile have been given exclusive rights to fish in particular areas, to give them an incentive to avoid over-fishing. In theory, they should be looking out for illegal poachers and reporting them to authorities, but they often don’t bother to do this. We wondered why.

Many fisheries around the world are over-fished, in some cases to the extent that the total catch of fish is less than it would be if fishing effort were reduced. Often, the over-fishing occurs because individual fishers have no incentive to reduce their own catch; if they do so, the fish they leave will be caught by other fishers, because the fishery is “open-access”.

Various policy approaches have been used to try to address this, including limits on fishing gear, limits on the length of a fishing season, and quotas on how many fish can be caught. A relatively recent approach has been the creation of Territorial User Rights for Fishers (TURFs). In this system, a group of fishers forms a cooperative, and they are given exclusive rights to catch the fish in a certain area (Wilen et al. 2012; Gelcich et al. 2012).

The idea is that, because other fishers outside the cooperative cannot come in and poach the conserved fish, members of the cooperative have an incentive to keep their own level of catch at a sensible level. Of course, this only works if the poachers are actually kept out.

One of my PhD students, Katrina Davis, was working on fisheries management in a part of Chile, and she found that fishers who were part of a TURF cooperative were often making no effort to detect poachers or report them to authorities. She wondered why.

One could imagine various reasons:

  • A judgement that the benefits of reducing poaching would be small. (Katrina’s previous research had shown that this was not true (Davis et al. 2015), but the fishers may have had a different perception.)
  • Concerns about the cost of monitoring TURF areas, especially those that were located at some distance from home.
  • Social norms that would make people uncomfortable about reporting others.
  • Concerns about personal safety if the poachers responded with violence.
  • Lack of action by government to penalise poachers who are reported.

Katrina conducted a survey of the fishers to get to the bottom of this (Davis et al. 2017). She’s pretty fluent in Spanish, which would have helped.

She found that it was mainly about failures of government.

Fishers believe that “the judicial process in Chile does not sufficiently recognise the negative impacts of poaching, and that punishments are not sufficiently severe to deter poachers. Fishers also complained that government institutions, such as the navy or fisheries service, do not always respond to their distress calls when they detect poachers in their management areas.” (Davis et al. 2017, p.676).

Thus the government often fails to meet their side of the bargain. It would be really frustrating to fishers who went to the bother of reporting poachers only to find that their report was ignored, or that the poachers got off with trivial fines. No wonder they stopped monitoring or reporting the poachers.

What this amounts to is that the rights that have been allocated to the fishers’ cooperative are greatly diminished. They are rights in name but not in reality.

It highlights that even where a kind of privatisation approach is used to manage a natural resource, there continues to be a critical role for government to protect and enforce the rights that have been created.

Further reading

Davis, K., Kragt, M., Gelcich, S., Schilizzi, S. and Pannell, D.J. (2015). Accounting for enforcement costs in the spatial allocation of marine zones, Conservation Biology 29(1), 226-237. Journal web page

Davis, K., Kragt, M., Burton, M., Schilizzi, S., Gelcich, S. and Pannell, D.J. (2017). Why are fishers not enforcing their marine user rights? Environmental and Resource Economics 67(4), 661-681. Journal web page

Wilen,. J.E., Cancino, J. and Uchida, H. (2012). The economics of Territorial Use Rights Fisheries, or TURFs, Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 6(2), 237-257. Journal web page ♦ IDEAS page

Gelcich, S., Fernández, M., Godoy, N., Canepa, A., Prado, L. and Castilla, J.C. (2012). Territorial User Rights for Fisheries as ancillary instruments for marine coastal conservation in Chile, Conservation Biology 26(6), 1005–1015. Journal web page

286 – Marine reserves and tourism benefits

Last year I made my first visit to Coral Bay, part of the Ningaloo Reef in the north-west of Western Australia. It was stunning to snorkel on the reef and see the richness of marine life there. One reason it’s so amazing is that the area is protected from fishing. (No fishing of any sort is permitted in Coral Bay itself, but shore-based recreational fishing for finfish is permitted in parts of the sanctuary areas.)

Coral Bay and nearby Exmouth are economically dependent on tourism. Without the systems in place to protect the reef, there would still be tourism, but surely not as much. This is one of the arguments in favour of establishing and enforcing marine protected areas, in addition to the benefits for fishers that I discussed last week.

But how significant are the tourism-related benefits that result from a marine protected area? We set out to try to answer that question for a particular case study: the shark sanctuary in Palau.

Palau is a small island state in the western Pacific, about 600 km east of the Philippines. It has several hundred islands, and 21,000 people. In 2009 it declared a ban on all fishing for sharks in its Exclusive Economic Zone – the world’s first shark sanctuary. Since then, shark-related tourism has boomed. There are many operators offering rides out to areas where reef sharks hang out. People go diving with these sharks, for a shot of adrenaline and bragging rights, I guess. The idea doesn’t appeal to me, but there are enough thrill seekers out there to keep lots of Palauans employed on the dive boats.

In addition, the tourists spend money in the other usual ways that tourists do: on hotels, meals, t-shirts, trinkets, and other tourist activities.

shark2Not all tourists who go to Palau are there specifically because of the sharks, of course, but plenty are. In our study, we focused on those tourists who said that they would not have gone there but for the shark-diving opportunities.

We surveyed a sample of tourists about their reasons for visiting Palau, their activities and their spending. Well, I didn’t personally, unfortunately. It was lead author Gabe Vianna who got to go there. He also surveyed tourism operators for more information about tourist spending on different types of trips. And we used government statistics to estimate the total number of tourists, and inferred the total number of tourists coming specifically for sharks, based on our tourist survey.

Economists measure economic benefits in a variety of ways. In this study, our approach was quite simple. We estimated the revenues obtained by businesses directly benefiting from the presence of shark divers (dive and tour operators, hotels, restaurants and souvenir shops). The calculation of the economic benefits from shark diving to the local community were restricted to wages provided by the dive operators to their employees and the revenues obtained by the fishers from selling their catches to shark divers. This approach doesn’t capture all the benefits, and it ignores the costs of providing goods and services, but it’s a useful indicator.

The results were really interesting. We found that shark diving is a major contributor to the economy of Palau, generating US$18 million per year and accounting for approximately 8% of the gross domestic product of the country. Annually, shark diving was responsible for payment of US$1.2 million in salaries to the local community, and generated US$1.5 million in taxes to the government.

Fishers earn more selling fish for consumption by shark divers than they would gain by catching sharks. The revenue generated by shark tourism is thousands of times greater than the revenue that would be generated by shark fishing.

Palau is just one example, of course, but it’s not the only country doing this sort of thing. Indeed, there is something of a boom in the declaration of marine protected areas by small island states, and other countries. Check out the map below (click on it to see a bigger version). These countries are judging that marine protected areas make good sense, not just ecologically, but economically.

mpas_small

Click on map to go to large original version at www.marine-conservation.org

 

Further reading

Grafton, R.Q., Kompas, T. and Van Ha, P. (2006). The Economic Payoffs from Marine Reserves: Resource Rents in a Stochastic Environment, The Economic Record 82(259), 469-480. Journal web site ♦ Ideas page

Vianna, G.M.S., Meekan, M.G., Pannell, D.J., Marsh, S.P. and Meeuwig, J.J. (2012). Socio-economic and community benefits from shark diving by tourists in Palau: a sustainable use of reef shark populations, Biological Conservation 145(1), 267-277. Abstract at journal web site

285 – The collapse of North Atlantic Cod

Humanity has a terrible track record when it comes to managing fisheries. There are many examples where over-fishing has led to the collapse of a fish population. One of the most spectacular collapses was the cod fishery in the north-west Atlantic.

Prior to the 1950s, cod had been fished off Canada for hundreds of years without any major decline in fish stocks. From the 1950s, fishing technologies improved and people got greedy.

“The decline began with the arrival of large factory stern trawlers in the late 1950s and the exploitation rate increased dramatically as these vessels were able to harvest cod offshore in winter months and at places where they were never previously caught,” (Grafton et al., 2009).

The numbers of cod caught by Canadian firms skyrocketed in the 1960s, crashed in the 1970s, recovered slightly in the 1980s and crashed to close to zero in the early 1990s.

cod_graph

http://www.grida.no/

The importance of the fishery to local economies in eastern Canada meant that their government was reluctant to take strong action to reduce fishing effort until it was too late. Right to the end, the government failed to respond as dramatically as it should have.

In 1992 they set a quota for cod catch that was more than the total amount caught the previous year. However, this quota was a foolish fantasy. By this stage the fish stock had been reduced to about one percent of what it was before the over-fishing started – there were almost no fish left that could practically be caught. So despite the quota, the government decided to impose a complete moratorium on cod fishing for two years, and since then the catch has been minimal compared to historic levels.

Ironically, the government’s delays in taking strong action were meant to benefit fishers, but this backfired terribly, resulting in huge job losses. The cod fishery had supported jobs for around 35,000 fishers and fish plant workers, although it should never have been that high, of course.

The dramatic reduction in fishing since 1992 has allowed cod stocks to recover a bit, but they remain very scarce compared to their earlier levels. In 2013 there were 10,500 tonnes of Atlantic Cod caught off eastern Canada, about 1% of the peak catch of 810,000 tonnes in 1968.

The loss of a dominant large fish from the marine ecosystem of the north-west Atlantic has had big flow-on effects, resulting in what ecologists call a “trophic cascade”, meaning that the populations of species lower down the food chain are dramatically altered.

codWe learn from our mistakes, if we’re sensible. In a few countries, fisheries management has improved significantly since the cod disaster. For example, New Zealand and Australia are relatively good at it compared to most countries. But globally, we are continuing to over-fish, to our own detriment. According to a 2008 report by the World Bank, “the difference between the potential and actual net economic benefits from marine fisheries is in the order of $50 billion per year – equivalent to more than half the value of the global seafood trade.” And “If fish stocks were rebuilt, the current marine catch could be achieved with approximately half of the current global fishing effort.”

Even in Australia there is more that we could do to secure our fish stocks in the long term. For example, Grafton et al. (2006) find that marine reserves where fishing is banned (Marine National Parks in our current parlance in Australia) can provide financial benefits to fishers in the long run, largely by accelerating the recovery of fish stocks in surrounding waters following an unexpected decline or “shock” (e.g. due to an environmental factor, or poor management).

If a Marine National Park is in place, fishers miss out on fishing in the reserve areas, but in the long run they are likely to be better off due to increased resilience, unless the frequency of shocks is really low.

Grafton et al. (2009) showed that a sizable no-take marine reserve in the north-west Atlantic (e.g. covering 40% of the total cod population) would have prevented the catastrophic crash in cod numbers, and would have been highly beneficial to fishers. However, the current review of zoning in our marine reserve system in Australia seems to be shaping up to reduce the planned area of Marine National Parks. I don’t think that would be in anybody’s interest.

Further reading

Grafton, R.Q., Kompas, T. and Van Ha, P. (2006). The Economic Payoffs from Marine Reserves: Resource Rents in a Stochastic Environment, The Economic Record 82(259), 469-480. Journal web site ♦ Ideas page

Grafton, R.Q., Kompas, T. and Van Ha, P. (2009). Cod today and none tomorrow: the economic value of a marine reserve, Land Economics 85(3), 454-469. Journal web site ♦ Ideas page

World Bank (2008). The Sunken Billions. The Economic Justification for Fisheries Reform. The World Bank. Washington D.C. Summary here