Category Archives: Economics

309 – Why do fishers in Chile put up with poachers?

Fishers in Chile have been given exclusive rights to fish in particular areas, to give them an incentive to avoid over-fishing. In theory, they should be looking out for illegal poachers and reporting them to authorities, but they often don’t bother to do this. We wondered why.

Many fisheries around the world are over-fished, in some cases to the extent that the total catch of fish is less than it would be if fishing effort were reduced. Often, the over-fishing occurs because individual fishers have no incentive to reduce their own catch; if they do so, the fish they leave will be caught by other fishers, because the fishery is “open-access”.

Various policy approaches have been used to try to address this, including limits on fishing gear, limits on the length of a fishing season, and quotas on how many fish can be caught. A relatively recent approach has been the creation of Territorial User Rights for Fishers (TURFs). In this system, a group of fishers forms a cooperative, and they are given exclusive rights to catch the fish in a certain area (Wilen et al. 2012; Gelcich et al. 2012).

The idea is that, because other fishers outside the cooperative cannot come in and poach the conserved fish, members of the cooperative have an incentive to keep their own level of catch at a sensible level. Of course, this only works if the poachers are actually kept out.

One of my PhD students, Katrina Davis, was working on fisheries management in a part of Chile, and she found that fishers who were part of a TURF cooperative were often making no effort to detect poachers or report them to authorities. She wondered why.

One could imagine various reasons:

  • A judgement that the benefits of reducing poaching would be small. (Katrina’s previous research had shown that this was not true (Davis et al. 2015), but the fishers may have had a different perception.)
  • Concerns about the cost of monitoring TURF areas, especially those that were located at some distance from home.
  • Social norms that would make people uncomfortable about reporting others.
  • Concerns about personal safety if the poachers responded with violence.
  • Lack of action by government to penalise poachers who are reported.

Katrina conducted a survey of the fishers to get to the bottom of this (Davis et al. 2017). She’s pretty fluent in Spanish, which would have helped.

She found that it was mainly about failures of government.

Fishers believe that “the judicial process in Chile does not sufficiently recognise the negative impacts of poaching, and that punishments are not sufficiently severe to deter poachers. Fishers also complained that government institutions, such as the navy or fisheries service, do not always respond to their distress calls when they detect poachers in their management areas.” (Davis et al. 2017, p.676).

Thus the government often fails to meet their side of the bargain. It would be really frustrating to fishers who went to the bother of reporting poachers only to find that their report was ignored, or that the poachers got off with trivial fines. No wonder they stopped monitoring or reporting the poachers.

What this amounts to is that the rights that have been allocated to the fishers’ cooperative are greatly diminished. They are rights in name but not in reality.

It highlights that even where a kind of privatisation approach is used to manage a natural resource, there continues to be a critical role for government to protect and enforce the rights that have been created.

Further reading

Davis, K., Kragt, M., Gelcich, S., Schilizzi, S. and Pannell, D.J. (2015). Accounting for enforcement costs in the spatial allocation of marine zones, Conservation Biology 29(1), 226-237. Journal web page

Davis, K., Kragt, M., Burton, M., Schilizzi, S., Gelcich, S. and Pannell, D.J. (2017). Why are fishers not enforcing their marine user rights? Environmental and Resource Economics 67(4), 661-681. Journal web page

Wilen,. J.E., Cancino, J. and Uchida, H. (2012). The economics of Territorial Use Rights Fisheries, or TURFs, Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 6(2), 237-257. Journal web page ♦ IDEAS page

Gelcich, S., Fernández, M., Godoy, N., Canepa, A., Prado, L. and Castilla, J.C. (2012). Territorial User Rights for Fisheries as ancillary instruments for marine coastal conservation in Chile, Conservation Biology 26(6), 1005–1015. Journal web page

307 – John Kerin’s memoirs

John Kerin was Minister for Primary Industries in the Australian Government between 1983 and 1991. His memoirs are now available as a free download. Having seen him speak several times since he ceased being a minister, I think his memoirs should be fascinating and very informative. Agriculture was very lucky to have him as minister during this period of great change and disruption. 

John Kerin was unusual as a minister in that he knew a lot about the issues he was responsible for. Not only was he experienced as an agricultural producer, but he was also trained as an agricultural economist, and worked for a while in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics.

Apparently, his expertise was not always appreciated by his department. In the last part of the book he says “the ethos of some government departments was that they preferred ministers who knew nothing – the better to manage or control them. However, I thought that it was not necessarily an impediment to know something about your portfolio areas. The constant rotation of ministers is not good for policy making.”

Not only did he know a lot, he was clearly very thoughtful and remarkably frank. “Nor … do I want to give the impression that I was always sure about what I was doing, what the outcome of some policy options may be or where the changes and reforms we were introducing may lead. … By nature I am a pessimist, slow to come to decisions and generally believe that I am wrong until convinced of the path to take.”

A landmark event during his term as minister was the wool crisis. His eventual decisions for the industry were critically important and rather heroic as they faced fierce opposition from the whole industry, which seemed determined to do itself almost unlimited damage.

Some of his perspectives are all too relevant in our current political climate. “I have always been terrified by people in politics who are absolutely sure they are right, have God on their side or tell me they are ‘men of principle’. Such people seem able to blind themselves to their own hypocrisy and humbuggery – and are dangerous.”

I’m really looking forward to reading the book.

Further reading

Kerin, J.C. (2017). The Way I Saw It; The Way It Was: The Making of National Agricultural and Natural Resource Management Policy, Analysis and Policy Observatory, Melbourne. Available here: http://apo.org.au/node/76216

Pannell, D. (2014). Supply and demand: the wool crisis, Pannell Discussions no. 266.

306 – Economics of green infrastructure in cities: some essentials

During the recent Conference of the CRC for Water Sensitive Cities in Perth, I was interviewed about some of the essential points that non-economists need to be aware of when thinking about the economics of water-related investments in cities. The video is now available.

My team has been part of the CRC since it started back in 2012. In the interview I talk a bit about the work we’ve already done and what we’re doing now, and then identify my three top tips for non-economists: that benefits from an investment relate to the differences in outcomes with versus without the investment (not before versus after); that the timing of benefits and costs can matter greatly to the economic results; and that you need to account to a range of risks that might cause any particular investment to deliver less than you’d hoped.

These issues are spelt out more in the video (13:50 long), which you can see right here.

Further reading

Pannell, D.J. (2015). Ranking projects for water sensitive cities – a practical guide, CRC for Water Sensitive Cities: here

Web site for our CRC project: here

305 – Feeling virtuous: what’s it worth?

We all like to feel good about ourselves. A product that makes us seem virtuous to others, or even to ourselves, would be worth paying more for than its strictly utilitarian value.

That was one of our hypotheses behind a surprising result in some recent research. We were trying to measure the benefits of installing a rainwater tank on an urban property in Perth. We did this by measuring the premium in house sale prices for houses that already had a rainwater tank installed, compared with similar houses that did not.

The results left us deeply puzzled. First, the price premium was enormous: around $18,000. Now the water in a typical tank, when full, is worth about $3, and a tanks lasts for about 15 years. That means that to use enough tank water to make the $18,000 price premium worth paying, you would you would have to use a full tank of water and refill it from rainfall about twice each day every day for the whole 15 years (assuming a 5% interest rate on your home loan). But that’s way beyond actual levels of rainwater use, and it doesn’t rain that much or that frequently in Perth anyway!

We were left scrambling for explanations for the high price premium. As I started off saying, an obvious one is the feel-good factor from knowing that one is contributing to water conservation. It could be a bit like organic food. Some of the price premium for that could reflect people’s concerns about environmental impacts of agricultural chemicals (as well as perceived health impacts).

Another possible explanation is that people may misjudge how much the water captured in the tanks is worth. Water from the tap really is most extraordinarily cheap, whereas the most common experience of paying for water for most people is bottled water, which is most extraordinarily expensive. So it would be understandable to some extent if people got this wrong. We cannot tell from the house sale data what is in peoples’ minds (e.g. about water cost), only the overall result.

A third explanation could be that our statistical analysis was faulty. If you look at the paper you’ll see that we tied ourselves in knots, testing the robustness of the stats in ways that are far beyond my own statistical skills (thanks co-authors), but we couldn’t make the result go away.

There was one more puzzle we couldn’t solve, as well. The price premium for rain tanks is far above the cost of installing a tank, so why doesn’t everybody with a house to sell invest in a rain tank? In fact only a small minority of houses sold do have them. I guess they aren’t aware of the potential price hike.

On the other hand, we don’t know what would happen to the premium if the proportion of houses with installed tanks was to increase substantially. It is likely that the greater supply of tanks would drive down the price premium to some extent.

Further reading

Zhang, F., Polyakov, M., Fogarty, J. and Pannell, D. (2015). The capitalized value of rainwater tanks in the property market of Perth, Australia, Journal of Hydrology 522, 317-325. Journal web site ♦ IDEAS page (includes link to freely downloadable version of the paper)

304 – Predicting behaviour change by farmers

I have a new paper out describing ADOPT, the Adoption and Diffusion Outcome Prediction Tool. We’ve paid the money to make it Open Access, so I hope you will make it worth our while having done that by going to the journal web site and downloading the paper for free.

There are many hundreds of research papers on the adoption of new practices by farmers. Pretty much all of them set out to explain the relative contributions of different factors to the past adoption or non-adoption of particular practices in particular regions. There are a bunch of review papers that try to make sense of the voluminous literature (including a beauty by Pannell et al. (2006)).

However, neither the original papers nor the reviews set out to address an issue that really matters to many people working in the agricultural sector, in research, extension, natural resource management, policy, sales, etc. That issue is the likely future adoption of a new practice that has not yet been adopted. An interdisciplinary group of us set out to fill this gap by developing ADOPT.

There are a large number of users of ADOPT – there have been over 1000 downloads of the tool, and many examples where it has been used effectively in planning or evaluation of research, extension or policy.

Now we have published this paper, which describes how we developed and validated the tool, how it is structured, and some example of its use.

You can download the paper for free here and you can download the ADOPT tool for free here. If you do it quickly, you’ll be one of the first to get a new update of the model, just released on June 29.

Also available now is Version 1.0 of the “Smallholder” version of ADOPT, designed for use in developing countries. Download it from the same web site here.

Also see http://www.ruralpracticechange.net for a set of videos on the topic of farmers adopting new practices.

References

Kuehne, G., Llewellyn, R., Pannell, D.J., Wilkinson, R., Dolling, P., Ouzman, J. and Ewing, M. (2017). Predicting farmer uptake of new agricultural practices: a tool for research, extension and policy, Agricultural Systems 156, 115-125. Journal web site for free download of the paper.

Pannell, D.J. and Vanclay, F.M. (eds) (2011). Changing Land Management: Adoption of New Practices by Rural Landholders, CSIRO Publishing, Canberra. Available at the publisher’s website.

Pannell, D.J., Marshall, G.R., Barr, N., Curtis, A., Vanclay, F. and Wilkinson, R. (2006). Understanding and promoting adoption of conservation practices by rural landholders. Australian Journal of Experimental Agriculture 46(11): 1407-1424. Journal web site, or email David.Pannell@uwa.edu.au to ask for a copy.