Category Archives: Research

234 – The benefits of environmental research

There has been a lot of research on the benefits of research, but little of it has addressed environmental research. In some ways, this is understandable, as it’s difficult. But we need to develop better ways to estimate these benefits as researchers are increasingly asked to justify their funding and quantify their impacts.

I organised a small workshop in Brisbane a few weeks ago on estimating the benefits of environmental research. If we could generate this information, it would be useful in several ways. It could be used to make judgements about whether particular research projects are worth doing, to identify priorities from a set of potential projects, and to make the case for continued funding of environmental research. Also, the process of working out the likely benefits could help us understand the ways that research generates benefits, and that might help us to do a better job of generating benefits.

However, as we quickly agreed at the workshop, this is a very difficult thing to do well. For one thing, there are so many different types of environmental research with different possible uses and impacts, and some of them need different thinking and approaches to analysis.

We decided to focus our attention onto the type of research that is least well served by existing tools and frameworks: research that is intended to influence environmental policy. It turns out that this is the most neglected aspect for a reason – it’s the most difficult one to deal with.

You can see why it’s difficult from the following list of stages that one must go through, starting from research and ending up with real-world benefits.

  • Funding is allocated to research and research is done
  • Something useful is learned – new information is generated (or isn’t)
  • The new information influences policy/management (or doesn’t)
  • Policy change is implemented by policy makers (or isn’t)
  • If the purpose of the policy is to change the behavior of people or businesses, these people respond to the changed policy (or don’t)
  • Changes (relative to no research) result in the environment (or not), including unexpected or unintended consequences

To estimate benefits, we need to estimate what happened (or predict what will happen) at each of these stages. If one link in the chain breaks, benefits are not generated. We also need to estimate (or predict) what would have happened in the absence the research – something you can’t actually observe even if the research has been completed and had its impacts.

Research that aims to influence policy is particularly difficult to assess, because the process of policy change is so complex and influenced by numerous factors. It is very difficult to judge what proportion of any particular change may be attributable to the research rather than other factors. This is recognised in the literature as the attribution problem.

Despite all the difficulties, we found that the existing frameworks for research evaluation provided enough of a platform for us to think productively about what we would do for this type of research. A team of us will be working on this challenge over the next while. We aim to work out what would be needed for a comprehensive rigorous framework, and from that produce a set of principles and perhaps rules of thumb that researchers, research funders and policy makers can use when they need to think about the benefits of policy-oriented environmental research.

Further reading

van der Most, F. (2010). Use and non-use of research evaluation: A literature review, Paper no. 2010/16, Circle, Lund University, Sweden. Here

233 – Journal refereeing

Peer review of research is a key mechanism for quality control used in science. Unfortunately, some reviewers (or referees) perform their task in a hard and heartless way.

Back in 2002 I published a poem about this in a refereed journal article. I’m pretty pleased with this – you don’t see many poems in refereed journals. This week, somebody told me that my poem had been included (with praise such as, “a beautiful piece of work”) on a web page of econometric poetry. I then did a search and, apart from finding the original paper, I found it reproduced on three other pages (here, here, here), and referred to on several more. Isn’t the web marvelous?

In case you haven’t seen it, here it is.

I’m The Referee
David J. Pannell

You’ve posted in your paper
To a journal of repute
And you’re hoping that the referees
Won’t send you down the chute

You’d better not build up a sense of
False security
I’ve just received your manuscript and
I’m the referee

This power’s a revelation
I’m so glad it’s come to me
I can be a total bastard with
Complete impunity

I used to be a psychopath
But never more will be
I can deal with my frustrations now that
I’m a referee

 

The poem is therapeutic, as was the paper it was published in (Pannell, 2002), so if you’ve suffered at the hands of referees, you might want to read that too.

Further reading

Pannell, D.J. (2002). Prose, psychopaths and persistence: personal perspectives on publishing. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 50(2), 101–116. Here ♦ IDEAS page for this paper

228 – Majority opinion

This week I saw a senior bureaucrat try to counter dissenting views on a government report by arguing that the great majority of people agreed with it. This is a highly flawed argument.

I was at a public seminar this week, at which the leader of a government inquiry was outlining the findings from the resulting report. He made the observation that the great majority of people seemed to agree with the findings, but that there was a small but vocal minority who did not.

Most of the audience seemed to be broadly on side with the speaker, bearing out his claim, but at least one took a very different position. During question time she made a vehement statement that amounted to a denunciation of the entire report.

The speaker responded in kind. He said he thought she probably hadn’t read the report. When she reacted angrily to that, he asserted, “then you didn’t understand it” and glared at her. Later he once again referred to “the small but vocal minority”, this time adding, “who should be ignored”.

It had been quite an aggressive comment, so perhaps the aggressive response was fair enough in a way, but the result was to close off debate. I guess that’s what the speaker wanted but I don’t think it was appropriate, and it didn’t go down well with some of the audience.

While the exchange of fire was exciting, the main thing I’m going to focus on is the speaker’s implication that the views of a group of people must be wrong and should be ignored because they are the views of a small minority. That’s a terrible argument. If evidence and logic is with the minority, it doesn’t matter how few in number they are. As Einstein said in response to a Nazi pamphlet titled 100 authors against Einstein, “If I had been wrong, one would have been enough”.

I’m not saying that the commenter was right. I haven’t read the report in question, so I can’t judge. All I’m saying is that the speaker was wrong to point to the number of people who agreed with the report as an indication that it was sound.

I have personal experience of being in an absolutely miniscule minority on a controversial issue, but eventually being accepted as the one who was correct. The issue was dryland salinity in Australia. My analysis in the early 2000s, drawing together the hydrogeology, economics and sociology of salinity, led me to conclude that the existing policy emphasis on integrated catchment management was misguided in most cases (Pannell, 2001a, 2001b).

Also, salinity management recommendations at the time emphasised the need for all farmers in a catchment to cooperate due to their supposed hydrological inter-dependence. I concluded that this too was misguided, initially for Western Australia (Pannell et al., 2001) and later more generally (Beverley et al., 2012).

For a long time I was the only one who was publicly putting these view, which ran counter to the way that almost everybody was thinking about the problem. An implication of my conclusions was that many millions of dollars were being wasted in public programs to fight salinity.

When I tried to put my position in conferences and meetings, I often generated strong negative reactions, including derision and anger. Many people working in the area said that I didn’t know what I was talking about and rejected my arguments out of hand. One notable incident involved a very public tirade of abuse from a fellow economist following my Presidential Address to the Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society in 2001.

Over time, the weight of evidence supporting my position got stronger and stronger (e.g. Barrett-Lennard et al., 2005), and I won people over, or maybe just wore them down. By the time of the Second International Salinity Forum in Adelaide in 2008, my views that had seemed heretical to many in 2001 had become the new orthodoxy.

The point is, it doesn’t matter how small the minority is, they might be right. Logic and evidence is what matters, not weight of numbers.

In fact, whenever there is a really important advance in knowledge that overturns a previous misconception, by definition, the person with the new insight is initially in the small minority.

The salinity experience has made me particularly attuned to the possibility that the majority can be wrong. As a result, I worry about the heavy reliance on scientific consensus as an argument in the climate debate. The consensus might well be right, but the fact that there is a consensus is not, in itself, an argument that should be convincing. There was an almost unanimous consensus about these two aspects of salinity management and policy that turned out to be wrong.

Further reading

Barrett-Lennard, E.G., George, R.J., Hamilton, G., Norman, H.C., Masters, D.G. (2005). Multi-disciplinary approaches suggest profitable and sustainable farming systems for valley floors at risk of salinity, Australian Journal of Experimental Agriculture 45: 1415–1424. Journal web site here

Beverly, C., Roberts, A., Hocking, M., Pannell, D. and Dyson, P. (2011). Using linked surface-groundwater catchment modelling to assess protection options for environmental assets threatened by dryland salinity in southern-eastern Australia, Journal of Hydrology 410: 13-30. Journal web site here

Pannell, D.J. (2001a). Salinity policy: A tale of fallacies, misconceptions and hidden assumptions, Agricultural Science 14(1): 35-37. Here

Pannell, D.J. (2001b). Dryland Salinity: Economic, Scientific, Social and Policy Dimensions, Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 45(4): 517-546. Journal web site here ♦ IDEAS page for this paper

Pannell, D.J., McFarlane, D.J. and Ferdowsian, R. (2001). Rethinking the externality issue for dryland salinity in Western Australia, Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 45(3): 459-475. Journal web site here ♦ IDEAS page for this paper

Pannell, D.J. and Roberts, A.M. (2010). The National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality: A retrospective assessment, Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics54(4): 437-456. Journal web site here ♦ IDEAS page for this paper

226 – Modelling versus science

Mick Keogh, from the Australian Farm Institute, recently argued that “much greater caution is required when considering policy responses for issues where the main science available is based on modelled outcomes”. I broadly agree with that conclusion, although there were some points in the article that didn’t gel with me. 

In a recent feature article in Farm Institute Insights, the Institute’s Executive Director Mick Keogh identified increasing reliance on modelling as a problem in policy, particularly policy related to the environment and natural resources. He observed that “there is an increasing reliance on modelling, rather than actual science”. He discussed modelling by the National Land and Water Resources Audit (NLWRA) to predict salinity risk, modelling to establish benchmark river condition for the Murray-Darling Rivers, and modelling to predict future climate. He expressed concern that the modelling was based on inadequate data (salinity, river condition) or used poor methods (salinity) and that the modelling results are “unverifiable” and “not able to be scrutinised” (all three). He claimed that the reliance on modelling rather than “actual science” was contributing to poor policy outcomes.

While I’m fully on Mick’s side regarding the need for policy to be based on the best evidence, I do have some problems with some of his arguments in this article.

Firstly, there is the premise that “science and modelling are not the same”. The reality is nowhere near as black-and-white as that. Modelling of various types is ubiquitous throughout science, including in what might be considered the hard sciences. Every time a scientist conducts a statistical test using hard data, she or he is applying a numerical model. In a sense, all scientific conclusions are based on models.

I think what Mick really has in mind is a particular type of model: a synthesis or integrated model that pulls together data and relationships from a variety of sources (often of varying levels of quality) to make inferences or draw conclusions that cannot be tested by observation, usually because the issue is too complex. This is the type of model I’m often involved in building.

I agree that these models do require particular care, both by the modeller and by decision makers who wish to use results. In my view, integrated modellers are often too confident about the results of a model that they have worked hard to construct. If such models are actually to be used for decision making, it is crucial for integrated modellers to test the robustness of their conclusions (e.g. Pannell, 1997), and to communicate clearly the realistic level of confidence that decision makers can have in the results. In my view, modellers often don’t do this well enough.

But even in cases where they do, policy makers and policy advisors often tend to look for the simple message in model results, and to treat that message as if it was pretty much a fact. The salinity work that Mick criticises is a great example of this. While I agree with Mick that aspects of that work were seriously flawed, the way it was interpreted by policy makers was not consistent with caveats provided by the modellers. In particular, the report was widely interpreted as predicting that there would be 17 million hectares of salinity, whereas it actually said that there would be 17 million hectares with high “risk” or “hazard” of going saline. Of that area, only a proportion was ever expected to actually go saline. That proportion was never stated, but the researchers knew that the final result would be much less than 17 million. They probably should have been clearer and more explicit about that, but it wasn’t a secret.

The next concern expressed in the article was that models “are often not able to be scrutinised to the same extent as ‘normal’ science”. It’s not clear to me exactly what this means. Perhaps it means that the models are not available for others to scrutinise. To the extent that that’s true (and it is true sometimes), I agree that this is a serious problem. I’ve built and used enough models to know how easy it is for them to contain serious undetected bugs. For that reason, I think that when a model is used (or is expected to be used) in policy, the model should be freely available for others to check. It should be a requirement that all model code and data used in policy is made publicly available. If the modeller is not prepared to make it public, the results should not be used. Without this, we can’t have confidence that the information being used to drive decisions is reliable.

Once the model is made available, if the issue is important enough, somebody will check it, and any flaws can be discovered. Or if the time frame for decision making is too tight for that, government may need to commission its own checking process.

This requirement would cause  concerns to some scientists. In climate science, for example, some scientists have actively fought  requests for data and code. (Personally, I think the same requirement should be enforced for peer-reviewed publications, not just for work that contributes to policy. Some leading economics journals do this, but not many in other disciplines.)

Perhaps, instead, Mick intends to say that even if you can get your hands on a model, it is too hard to check. If that is what he means, I disagree. I don’t think checking models generally is harder than checking other types of research. In some ways it is easier, because you should be able to replicate the results exactly.

Then there is the claim that poor modelling is causing poor policy. Of course, that can happen, and probably has happened. But I wouldn’t overstate how great a problem this is at the moment, because model results are only one factor influencing policy decisions, and they often have a relatively minor influence.

Again, the salinity example is illustrative. Mick says that the faulty predictions of salinity extent were “used to allocate funding under the NAP”. Apparently they influenced decisions about which regions would qualify for funding from the salinity program. However, in my judgement, they had no bearing on how much funding each of the 22 eligible regions actually received. That depended mainly on how much and how quickly each state was prepared to allocate new money to match the available Federal money, coupled with a desire to make sure that no region or state missed out on an “equitable” share (irrespective of their salinity threat).

The NLWRA also reported that dryland salinity is often a highly intractable problem. Modelling indicated that, in most locations, a very large proportion of the landscape area would need to be planted to perennials to get salinity under control. This was actually even more important information than the predicted extent of salinity because it ran counter to the entire philosophy of the NAP, of spreading the available money thinly across numerous small projects. But this information, from the same report, was completely ignored by policy makers. The main cause of the failure of the national salinity policy was not that it embraced dodgy modelling about the future extent of salinity, but that it ignored much more soundly based modelling that showed that the strategy of the policy was fundamentally flawed.

Mick proposes that “Modellers may not necessarily be purely objective, and “rent seeking” can be just as prevalent in the science community as it is in the wider community.” The first part of that sentence definitely is true. The last part definitely is not. Yes, there are rent-seeking scientists, but most scientists are influenced to a greater-or-lesser extent by the explicit culture of honesty and commitment to knowledge that underpins science. The suggestion that, as a group, scientists are just as self-serving in their dealings with policy as other groups that lack this explicit culture is going too far.

Nevertheless, despite those points of disagreement, I do agree with Mick’s bottom line that “Governments need to adopt a more sceptical attitude to modelling ‘science’ in formulating future environmental policies”. This is not just about policy makers being alert to dodgy modellers. It’s also about policy makers using information wisely. The perceived need for a clear, simple answer for policy sometimes drives modellers to express results in a way that portrays a level of certainty that they do not deserve. Policy makers should be more accepting that the real world is messy and uncertain, and engage with modellers to help them grapple with that messiness and uncertainty.

Having said this, I’m not optimistic that it will actually happen. There are too many things stacked against it.

Perhaps one positive thing that could conceivably happen is adoption of Mick’s recommendation that “Governments should consider the establishment of truly independent review processes in such instances, and adopt iterative policy responses which can be adjusted as the science and associated models are improved.” You would want to choose carefully the cases when you commissioned a review, but there are cases when it would be a good idea.

Some scientists would probably argue that there is no need for this because their research has been through a process of “peer reviewed” before publication. However, I am of the view that peer review is not a sufficient level of scrutiny for research that is going to be used as the basis for large policy decisions. In most cases, peer review provides a very cursory level of scrutiny. For big policy decisions, it would be a good idea for key modelling results to be independently audited, replicated and evaluated.

Further reading

Keogh, M. (2012). Has modelling replaced science? Farm Institute Insights 9(3), 1-5.

Pannell, D.J. (1997). Sensitivity analysis of normative economic models: Theoretical framework and practical strategies. Agricultural Economics 16(2): 139-152. Full paper here ♦ IDEAS page for this paper

Pannell, D.J. and Roberts, A.M. (2010). The National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality: A retrospective assessment, Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics54(4): 437-456. Journal web site here ♦ IDEAS page for this paper

214 – The perils of asking people

Most of us answer survey questionnaires now and then. If we take a survey seriously, we probably feel that the responses we provide capture how we really feel. Most of us are unaware of how sensitive our answers can be to the way a question is asked.

There are various reasons why it can be a good idea to ask the public about their beliefs, their preferences, their likely behaviour, and so on. Social scientists, including economists, do it regularly. Reasons include to help evaluate policies or projects, or just to understand people. Governments also do it, to help decide which policies to adopt, and how to implement them.

Most people who are not social scientists have no idea how tricky this task of asking people can be. Here is an illustration.

Suppose that the government wishes to foster water conservation by encouraging the adoption of a package of water saving technologies in the home. People who adopt these measures will have lower water bills because of lower water consumption, but the government wants to provide an additional push, and provides a one-off discount on the water bill for households that install them.

Proposal 1: Would you support a proposal that rich households (e.g. with family income over $300,000 per year) should receive a higher discount than poor households (e.g. with family income below $50,000 per year)? Assume that the level of water saving is the same with or without this proposal.

If you are like most people, you would not support that proposal. To most of us, it seems unreasonable to favour rich people. They are already better off, so why should they get an additional benefit?

Now suppose instead that the government takes a different approach to the scheme. In that first scheme, the default position was that the household did not adopt the technologies, and a discount was provided if they did. In the alternative scheme, the view is that everybody should install the technologies, so the default position is that every household does. Everybody receives a one-off reduction in their water bill (the same reduction for everybody, consistent with your preference under the first proposal) to help offset the installation costs. Those households that cannot demonstrate that they have installed the technologies will be hit with a surcharge on their bill.

Proposal 2: Would you support a proposal that poor households should pay just as large a surcharge as rich households? Assume that the level of water saving is the same with or without this proposal.

You probably reject that proposal too. It feels unreasonable, doesn’t it?

If you are one of the majority who answers ‘no’ to both proposals, the bad news is that this is completely illogical. Saying ‘no’ to the first proposal is exactly equivalent to saying ‘yes’ to the second, and answering ‘no’ to the second proposal is equivalent to answering ‘yes’ to the first proporal.

To illustrate: if you say ‘no’ to the first proposal, you are saying that the savings on the water bills of poor people from installing the technology should be just as large as for rich people.

If you say ‘no’ to the second proposal, you are saying that the savings on the water bills of poor people from installing the technology should be less than for rich people. (They would get charged less for not installing, so the cost avoided if they do install would be less.)

(If you are finding it hard to get your head around that, there is a numerical example at the end that should make it clear.)

Why did you answer so illogically? Most people can’t answer this question. They just feel confused.

If you were in the illogical majority and answered ‘no’ to both proposals, go back and look again at both proposals and decide which one do you want to change to ‘yes’.

The amazing thing is that you probably don’t want to change either answer. They both still feel absolutely right, even though you now know that one gives the opposite result to the other.

If we did a public survey on this, we would get completely different results depending on how we described the system – as based on discounts or surcharges.

So which result would be the true representation of how people feel about these issues? My proposed answer to this question is neither/both. The worrying thing for a researcher is that the two contradictory outcomes can both be an accurate reflection of how people feel, depending on the wording and context of the question. It’s as if the real world changes depending on how you ask the question.

This dependence of people’s answers on the wording and context of questions is called a ‘framing effect’. Skilled survey developers who wish to get reasonably accurate results are well aware of the risk of framing effects (although sometimes it is hard to decide which frame is preferred, as in the above example). Less skilled/experienced survey developers – perhaps people who are not social scientists and are just having a go at a survey – often make awful mistakes.

Where does that leave us? Amongst other things, I think it means that we need to be cautious and humble in interpreting the results of surveys and other forms of public consultation. Remember that the way that people express their preferences and beliefs can sometimes be highly sensitive to how the question is asked, and be prepared to take any particular survey result with at least a pinch of salt. I always like to see the exact wording of a survey before I put too much weight on its findings.

It also highlights the importance of not taking the task of developing a survey lightly. If you are responsible for a survey, make sure you use an expert or get expert help and become well-informed about the pitfalls.

Numerical example

Water bills before policy change: Poor people $300; Rich people $500

Scheme 1 (subsidy)

Water bills if we answer ‘no’ to proposal 1, and the subsidy to both groups is $100.

  • If they don’t adopt: Poor $300; Rich $500
  • If they do adopt: Poor $200; Rich $400

Scheme 2 (surcharge)

The discount given to everyone, on the assumption that everyone adopts, is $100. If we answer ‘yes’ to proposal 2, the surcharge to both groups for not adopting is $100.

  • If they don’t adopt: Poor $300; Rich $500
  • If they do adopt: Poor $200; Rich $400

Notice that all the bills are the same as before, whether they adopt or not. So answering ‘no’ to proposal 1 is identical to answering ‘yes’ to proposal 2. If we answer ‘no’ to proposal 2, the bills for people who don’t adopt might be, say, $250 and $500, so rich people get a larger benefit from adopting. That corresponds to answering ‘yes’ to proposal 1.

Further reading

Bütler, M. and Maréchal, M.A. (2007). Framing effects in political decision making: evidence from a natural voting experiment, University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper, number 2007-04. IDEAS page for this paper

Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York.

Kragt, M. & Bennett, J. W. (2012). Attribute framing in choice experiments: How do attribute level descriptions affect value estimates? Environmental and Resource Economics, 51, 43-59. IDEAS page for this paper

Pannell, P.B.W. and Pannell, D.J. (1999). Introduction to Social Surveying: Pitfalls, Potential Problems and Preferred Practices, SEA Working Paper 99/04.